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Patterns of Remittances and Labor Migration in the Arab World

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INTRODUCTION

The past decade has witnessed a significant change in the nature and volume of Arab migration. The rapid increase in the financial assets of the major oil producing states in the region since 1973/74 and their adoption of ambitious development plans provided a qualitative transformation of the migration process among the Arab states. The transformation was multifaceted. Some of the oil-producing states, such as Iran and Iraq, ceased to be labor exporters and became the importers of labor from non-oil neighbouring states and from Asian countries. As a result, the unemployment problems of some of the non-oil producing states such as Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Egypt vanished in the late 1970s.

The purpose of this paper is to survey the record to date. What have been the major migratory patterns? How have these affected the flow of remittances in the Arab world? What structural characteristics have been associated with these developments?

PATTERNS OF MIGRATION IN THE ARAB WORLD

Labor migration in the Arab World has gone through at least five major phases in the post World War II period:¹

- During the inter-war period to October 1973, migration was characterized by two types of movement. Egyptians (and to a lesser extent, Jordanians) migrated to other Arab countries, principally as teachers and administrators, staffing the administrative framework of the Gulf States. Their small numbers made control of the migration process possible, since it required minimal organization and regulation by the governments of both the sending and receiving states. In addition, there was some migration of unskilled workers for work in the service and construction sector of various states - Yemenis to Saudi Arabia and Sudanese to Egypt.

In general, most of the migrant workers originated from other Arab states, and no single migrant group dominated the labor force of any one labor receiving country, with the exception of 200,000-250,000 Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia. Together with an estimated 94,000 Egyptians, 92,000 Syrians and 71,000 Palestinians, they represented the majority of the half million Arabs working abroad at the time.

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- The oil price increases of 1973/74 spurred a second wave of migration. Arab countries experienced large scale adjustments in their national labor forces and a general expansion of economic activity. The number of expatriate workers expanded to 1,800,000 between 1970 and 1975, with most of the increases occurring in the last two years. Both the labor importing and labor exporting states found that growth demand for labor taxed the minimal regulatory policies and mechanisms in place. At the same time, sending states eagerly sought to encourage rather than constrain the export of labor.
- The third phase of interstate migration in the Middle East evolved through the latter part of the 1980s. Arab workers continued to migrate but the Gulf States began to recruit large numbers of South Asian workers. As early as 1975, Indians and Pakistanis accounted for 18 percent of all migrant workers. From less than 200,000 in 1975, the number of Pakistanis working in the Middle East increased to 500,000 in 1977; by 1979 this had reached 1.25 million. The large scale entry of Asians into the labor markets of the Middle East was a response to the increased demand for migrant workers. By the end of the 70s, Asians were almost as numerous as Arabs in the foreign workforces of the region.
- The fourth phase began at the end of the 1970s and is characterized by a growing complexity in Asian labor: Koreans, Taiwanese, Filipinos and others began to appear in great numbers. At the same time, governments in both sending and receiving countries assumed a much more active role in managing the migration process. During the fourth phase, mobility was characterized by its sheer magnitude relative to national labor markets. Almost every state in the region was participating in the migration process. In the Gulf States alone, there may have been 3.5 to 4.65 million migrants in a combined labor force of 9 million workers-migrants, constituting about 40-46 percent of the labor force.
- By this time the governments of the Gulf States could no longer refrain from policy intervention. They began urging, if not forcing, migrants to return home upon completion of their contracts. Visa, residency and citizenship laws were strengthened and pressure was put on the business sector to adhere to recruitment and employment procedures. South Korean work camp projects were seen as an attractive alternative to expanding the expatriate communities already in place, while at the same time minimizing the visibility of the foreign workers.
- The final phase began in the mid-1980s, a period of stabilization in the total number of migrants. The migration process at present appears to be characterized by a shift toward the import of more highly skilled labor, a concomitant shift in the sectoral allocation of labor from construction to industry and services and a relatively small increase in the proportion of East Asian workers.

In terms of the actual pattern of employment (Tables 1 and 2, pages 569 and 570), the Gulf States vary considerably in terms of the relative importance of foreign workers. In 1985, foreign² workers comprised well over 80 percent of the workforce in Qatar and the UAE. Next in terms of foreign worker dependence was Kuwait, where nearly 65 percent of the workforce were non-nationals. Despite many public statements of the government's avowed goal to reduce its dependence on foreign workers, non-national workers increased their share of the Saudi-Arabian workforce from 34 percent in 1975 to nearly 50 percent by 1985.

The labor exporting countries were led by Egypt on an absolute basis. However, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen had much higher percentages of their labor force working overseas.

The sectoral distribution of the foreign workforce (Table 3, page 571) has varied somewhat from country to country, but aggregate figures are fairly accurate depictions of

the situation in the individual economies. In 1973, non-nationals dominated two sectors: construction, where their share was 79 percent, and manufacturing, where their share was 67 percent.

Only in agriculture was the percentage of non-nationals low (9 percent). The traditional nature of agriculture explains this slight representation of migrants, because international migration to these countries tends to be to the modern rather than the traditional sector. This situation has changed somewhat over the years in Saudi Arabia and Libya, where modernization of the agricultural sector and withdrawal of national labor from it increased the demand for foreign labor.

The figures in Table 2 (page 570), anticipate that the percentage of foreign labor in each sector would increase through 1985, even in the low forecast for that year.

Three scenarios have been developed to assess the likely patterns of migration into the 1990s:

- For the Gulf States⁴, migration reaches a plateau in the mid to late 1980s and then declines. This is due in part to structural change in the economies of the labor importers, in conjunction with weakening financial surpluses and emerging political opposition to continued unbridled growth, motivated in part by the large numbers of migrants in these host countries. A downward slide in the price of crude petroleum accentuates these trends.

- The relatively slow growth of national labor forces combined with continued strong demand for labor, results in a stabilization and even an increase in the flows of workers to the Gulf countries⁵.

- The willingness of Asian workers to accept rapidly lowering wages and deteriorating conditions of employment will cause their numbers to hold up as long as the recession lasts. As employers have been able to secure equivalent skills for lower prices, they have delayed exporting workers. When the oil markets revive (around 1990) the number of foreign workers will be greater than in 1987 (but not their peak of 1984). Greater participation by local women will tend to reduce the demand for some types of foreign workers⁶.

PATTERNS OF REMITTANCES

By the early 1980s, there were probably some six million migrant workers in the six Gulf States, of whom over two million were Arabs, about 3.7 million from Asia, and the rest from Africa, Europe and the Americas. This compares with only about 660,000 migrant workers in 1970, the product of the earlier boom and 1,250,000 in 1975 - perhaps a fifth of whom were Asians.

Obviously, the migration of labor has been tied very closely to the oil price boom. This has occurred in two important ways. It was the boom which vastly increased the demand for labor in the oil exporting countries, while at the same time giving the labor sending countries every incentive to try to compensate for the crippling rise in the cost of their oil imports by encouraging their citizens to work abroad and remit as large a portion of their wages as possible.

There is considerable controversy concerning the actual magnitude of remittances in the region. It is apparent that under-reporting is a problem. Formal channels capture only part of the remittances, but the exact percentage is far from clear⁷. Research on remittances from France to North Africa, for example, suggests that around 20 percent of remittances are not transmitted by money order, but through less formal channels. Remittances may also be made in kind, with the goods sometimes being resold after clearing customs - a practice which exporting governments are trying to eliminate⁸.

In terms of the official statistics, remittances are included in the balance of payment figures under 'unrequited transfers'. These are offsetting entries for the provision of real resources or financial items by one economy to another without a *quid-pro-quo*. This means that whenever a given economy does not receive (supply) a recompense in the form of real resources or financial items for goods, services, or capital supplied to (or received from) another economy, the balance of payment statement records an unrequited transfer. The value of the unrequited transfer has to be the same as that of the real and financial resources to which the unrequited transfer is offset.

Several trends stand out in the recorded⁹ volume of remittances (Tables 4-7, pages 572-575):

- Despite the post-1982 fall in oil prices and revenues, many of the Arab labor exporting countries have been able to maintain and even increase their remittances. For example, Jordan's remittances in 1986 were higher than those received at the height of the oil boom (1981). The same is also true for Tunisia and Egypt although, in the latter case, the 1986 level of remittances was lower than that received in 1980.
- The usual case, however, has been for a fall-off in remittances in recent years. This decline has been fairly dramatic for several of the major exporters, including the two Yemens and Sudan.
- The labor importers are dominated by Saudi Arabia. While this country's remittances have fallen off somewhat in recent years, the 1986 figures had not declined in a manner commensurate with the country's oil revenues. While oil revenues have fallen from around \$95 billion in 1981 to about \$20 billion in 1986, remittances declined from \$5.3 billion in 1981 to \$4.9 billion in 1986.
- On the other hand, several of the labor importers actually had higher levels of remittance payments in 1986 than in the early 1980s. Kuwait, the second largest labor importer actually had significantly larger remittances in 1986 than experienced in 1981 or 1982. The same also applies to Bahrain whose remittances in 1982 were over twice those of 1980. The same is true of Oman.

How significant are these foreign currency inflows for the recipient countries? Again, keeping in mind that the actual level of remittances is most likely understated, it is still apparent that they account for significant shares of gross national product. The following patterns are of particular interest (Tables 8, page 576 and 9, page 577):

- Most importantly, it is apparent that many of the countries receive a significant proportion, often well over half, of their foreign exchange from remittances. Jordan falls in this category, as do Egypt and the Sudan in recent years. As is well known, the Yemens receive most of their foreign exchange from this source.
- While leveling off in absolute terms in recent years, remittances have been increasing as a share of export earnings for several of the major exporters: Jordan, Egypt, the Yemens, Tunisia, and Sudan have all had remittances score significant increases in their share of exports.
- On the other hand, there has been a leveling off or even slight decline in the importance of remittances in the overall Gross Domestic Product of several of the major labor exporters. These include PDR Yemen, and perhaps Jordan and Egypt. Remittances have increased in relative importance in the economies of Yemen Arab Republic and perhaps Sudan.

Before testing for the impact that labor exportation may have in the Middle East, it is instructive to examine some of the major structural differences between the labor importers and exporters. Several measures of both output and expenditures were examined (Table 10, page 578).

- **Sectorial Composition of Output.** To reduce the effect of fluctuating oil revenues on the sectoral composition of output, the shares of the major productive sectors were examined in terms of their percentage of non-oil Gross Domestic Product. The major sectors considered were: (a) agriculture, (b) manufacturing, (c) construction, (d) services, (e) distribution¹⁰.
- **Measures of Expenditures.** Five major expenditure categories were analyzed: (a) absorption/GDP, (b) imports/absorption, (c) resource gap (exports minus imports/absorption) (d) government expenditure/absorption and (e) military expenditure/absorption¹¹.

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES

In terms of the major differences between labor exporters and importers over time:

- As might be expected from the geography of the region, the labor importers have a relatively small share of non-oil output devoted to agriculture - this share seems to have stabilized at around 5 percent of non-oil GDP. The share of agriculture in the labor exporting countries also appears to have stabilized for the time being at around 25 percent of non-oil GDP.
- In general, the labor importing countries have, relative to their labor exporting counterparts, considerably higher shares of their non-oil output accounted for by construction, services and, to a lesser extent, distributive activities. The shares of these activities have been more stable in the case of the labor exporting countries.
- On the expenditure side, major differences exist between the two groups of countries, with labor importers historically having absorption rates below total output and the labor exporters spending more than they produce. This phenomenon is reflected both in the higher absorption to GDP rate for the exporters and the higher resource gap (exports minus imports) to GDP for the labor importers.
- In recent years, government expenditures have accounted for a higher percentage of expenditures in the labor importing countries, although in 1975 the labor exporters had a higher share of total government expenditures and military expenditures.
- The resource gap, although narrowing in recent years, was positive for the labor importers throughout the period under consideration, indicating a balance of payments surplus for the group as a whole. Correspondingly, the labor exporters experienced a chronic balance of payments deficit throughout this period.
- While labor importers had a significantly higher rate of imports to total expenditures in both 1975 and 1980, they ended the period with rates identical to those experienced by the labor exporters.

These trends reveal significant differences between the labor importers. In particular, major differences lie in the sectoral composition of output.

CONCLUSIONS

Surveys of this sort always raise more questions than they answer. In particular, future research is needed to answer the following questions:

- Have remittances been channelled into productive investment or have they played a minor role in the development of the major labor exporters?
- If remittances have been unproductive, in what sense has this occurred and what can be done to rectify the situation?

- Has the outflow of workers from the exporting countries taken a toll in terms of reduced output and, if so, in which sectors? If present, how can this problem be minimized?

Until these questions are satisfactorily answered, the development of any meaningful manpower policies on the part of either labor importers or exporters will be impossible.

NOTES

1. Based on N. Choucri, *The Hidden Economy: A New View of Remittances in the Arab World*. pp. 698-699. *World Development*. June 1986.
2. The 1985 figures were calculated by adjusting 'low' labor forecasts presented in I. Serageldin, J.A. Socknat, S. Birks, B. Li, and C. A. Sinclair, *Manpower and International Labor Migration in the Middle East and North Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Based on the GCC employment figures presented in S. Birks and C. Sinclair, *Saudi Arabia to the 90s* (Durham: Mountjoy Research Centre, 1989), the 1985 forecast figures were then proportionalized downward to reflect the recent fall off in the region's demand for foreign workers. The total labor forces (domestic plus foreign components) of the labor exporting countries were assumed unchanged, but their compositions were adjusted to reflect the lower foreign component. The figures for 1980 were calculated by interpolating the 1975 and 1985 figures.
3. Based on Serageldin *et al.*, pp. 30-31.
4. N. Choucri, *op.cit.*, p. 699.
5. N. Sherbiny, *Labor and Capital Flows in the Arab World: A Critical View*. Kuwait: Industrial Bank of Kuwait, The IBK Papers, N° 16, February 1985.
6. A scenario developed largely for Saudi Arabia by J. Birks and C. Sinclair, *Saudi Arabia to the 90s*, Durham: Birks and Sinclair, Ltd. 1989.
7. Cf. N. Choucri *The Hidden Economy: A New View of Remittances in the Arab World*. pp. 687-712 *World Development*, 1986, for an excellent discussion of the problems associated with the reported figures.
8. P. Hallwood, *Labor Migration and Remittances between OPEC Members and Non-Oil LDCs*. p. 42. *Middle East Review*. Spring 1987.
9. Data are from the Arab Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries: 1976-86*. Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988.
10. Data was used from: The Arab Monetary Fund *National Income Accounts of Member Countries, 1974-85*. Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987.
11. Absorption is defined as total expenditures. Data is from: Arab Monetary Fund, *op. cit.*, and Sivard, *op. cit.*

Table 1

Estimates and Forecasts of Employment in the Arab World, 1975-85

(labor force in thousands)

Importing Countries	1975		1980		1985	
	Total	% non-Nat.	Total	% non-Nat.	Total	% non-Nat.
Bahrain	78.7	37.0	104.0	41.7	129.2	46.3
Kuwait	297.5	70.8	782.2	67.6	392.8	64.3
Libya	734.5	38.2	997.3	42.3	1 260.0	46.3
Oman	192.1	53.7	224.5	47.5	256.8	41.2
Qatar	73.8	83.1	103.7	84.5	133.5	85.8
Saudi Arabia	1 968.4	34.0	2 511.6	41.4	3 054.8	48.8
UAE	292.4	84.7	431.0	87.0	569.6	89.2
Algeria	3 082.9	0.3	3 518.3	1.7	3 953.5	3.1
Iraq	3 007.6	0.2	3 632.6	2.0	4 257.6	3.8

Exporting Countries	1975			1980			1985		
	Total	% Abroad	Domestic	Total	% Abroad	Domestic	Total	% Abroad	Domestic
Egypt	9 070	3.7	8 734	10 112	4.5	9 657	11 154	5.2	10 574
Jordan	207	40.2	124	296	40.6	176	385	41.0	227
Lebanon	522	5.0	496	554	8.0	510	587	10.9	523
Oman	89	25.8	66	120	24.3	91	151	22.8	117
Sudan	3 674	0.7	3 648	3 518	1.5	3 465	3 361	2.3	3 284
Syria	1 741	2.1	1 704	1 839	3.3	1 778	1 936	4.5	1 849
Tunisia	1 599	1.8	1 570	1 757	2.5	1 713	1 914	3.1	1 855
YAR	1 033	24.1	784	1 061	25.0	796	1 087	25.9	805
PDRY	311	12.9	271	333	15.8	280	354	18.6	288

Other Countries	1975	1980	1985
	Total	Total	Total
Morocco	4 308	4 620	4 932

Source: Ismail Serageldin, James A. Socknat, Stace Birks, Bob Li and Clive A. Sinclair, *Manpower and International Labor Migration in the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 26).

Table 2

Estimates of Employment in the GCC States, 1985

(labor force in thousands)

Importing Countries	1985 Forecast				1985 Estimated		
	Total	National	Foreign	% Nat.	Total	National	Foreign
GCC States							
Bahrain	129.2	69.4	59.8	53.7	129.6	69.6	60.0
Kuwait	392.8	140.4	252.4	35.7	345.7	123.4	222.3
Oman	256.8	151.1	105.7	58.8	507.3	298.3	209.0
Qatar	133.5	18.9	114.6	14.2	115.5	16.4	99.1
Saudi Arabia	3 054.8	1 565.2	1 489.6	51.2	2 716.0	1 390.6	1 325.4
UAE	569.6	61.6	508.0	10.8	567.6	61.3	506.3
Sub-Total	4 536.7	2 006.6	2 530.1		4 381.1	1 959.6	2 421.5
Other Arab Labor Importers							
Libya	1 260.0	672.8	587.2	53.4	1217.2	650.0	567.2
Algeria	3 953.5	3 830.9	122.6	96.9	3 819.5	3 700.7	118.8
Iraq	4 257.6	4 095.8	161.8	96.2	4 112.8	3 956.5	156.3
Sub-Total	9 471.1	8 599.5	871.6		9 149.5	8 307.2	842.3
TOTAL	14 007.8	10 606.1	3 401.7		13 530.6	10 266.8	3 263.8

Exporting Countries	1985 Forecast				1985 Estimated		
	Total	% Overseas	Domestic	Overseas	Total	Overseas	Domestic
Egypt	11 154	5.2	10 574	580	11 178	556	10 622
Jordan	385	41.0	227	158	391	152	239
Lebanon	587	10.9	523	64	590	61	529
Oman	151	22.8	117	34	152	33	119
Sudan	3 361	2.3	3 284	77	3 364	74	3 290
Syria	1 936	4.5	1 849	87	1 940	83	1 857
Tunisia	1 914	3.1	1 855	59	1 916	57	1 859
YAR	1 087	25.9	805	282	1 099	270	829
PDRY	354	18.6	288	66	357	63	294

Other Countries	1975	1980	1985
	Total	Total	Total Abroad
Morocco	4 308	104.0	129.2

Source: Ismail Serageldin, James A. Socknat, Stacey Birks, Bob Li and Clive A. Sinclair, *Manpower and International Labor Migration in the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 26).

Table 3

Employment of Nationals and Non-nationals
by Economic Sector in the Major Labor-importing Countries:
Actual 1975 Figures, "Low" Forecasts, 1985

(Employment and number in thousands)

Sector	1975			1985		
	Total	% per Sector	% Share	Total	% per Sector	% Share
Agriculture						
Nationals	935.1	90.8	45.9	804.7	73.6	30.0
Non-nat.	94.9	9.2	5.9	288.5	26.4	9.3
Mining						
Nationals	41.6	63.2	2.1	47.6	46.5	1.8
Non-nat.	24.2	36.8	1.5	54.8	53.5	1.8
Manufacture						
Nationals	48.7	33.2	2.4	119.1	40.1	4.4
Non-nat.	97.8	66.8	6.1	177.4	59.9	5.7
Utilities						
Nationals	28.7	53.8	1.4	44.9	43.3	1.7
Non-nat.	24.6	46.2	1.5	58.7	56.7	1.9
Construction						
Nationals	153.2	21.3	7.5	396.6	31.7	14.8
Non-nat.	563.9	78.7	35.2	853.1	68.3	27.4
Trade and Finance						
Nationals	163.5	42.4	8.0	255.4	39.8	9.5
Non-nat.	221.6	57.6	13.8	401.3	61.1	12.9
Transportation and Communications						
Nationals	122.2	51.1	6.0	181.7	43.7	6.8
Non-nat.	116.8	48.9	7.4	233.9	56.3	7.5
Services						
Nationals	543.7	54.3	26.7	832.7	44.3	31.0
Non-nat.	457.0	45.7	28.6	1 046.0	55.7	33.5
TOTAL						
Nationals	2 036.7	56.0	100.0	2 682.7	46.3	100.0
Non-nat.	1 600.8	44.0	100.0	3 113.7	53.7	100.0

Source: Ismail Serageldin, James A. Socknat, Stace Birks, Bob Li and Clive A. Sinclair, *Manpower and International Labor Migration in the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 32).

Table 4
Worker Remittances in the
Arab World: Labor Exporters, 1976-1981

(millions of US dollars)

Country	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Jordan receipts	410.9	469.9	522.0	601.0	794.4	1 032.5
Jordan payments	- 24.4	- 54.4	- 67.7	- 100.5	- 161.8	- 162.3
Jordan net	386.5	415.5	454.3	500.5	632.6	870.2
Algeria receipts	451.4	370.1	419.4	444.4	451.6	465.8
Algeria payments	- 63.5	- 84.1	- 112.7	- 130.5	- 165.3	- 149.8
Algeria net	387.9	286.0	306.7	313.9	286.3	316.0
Syria receipts	53.1	92.2	636.0	901.8	773.1	583.3
Syria payments	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Syria net	53.1	92.2	636.0	901.8	773.1	583.3
Somalia receipts	1.4	3.2	78.1	36.7	57.3	56.2
Somalia payments	- 0.2	- 0.9	- 0.1	- 0.8	- 0.0	- 2.7
Somalia net	1.2	2.3	78.0	35.9	57.3	53.5
Egypt receipts	841.6	987.7	1 824.2	2 268.8	2 791.7	2 229.9
Egypt payments	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Egypt net	841.6	987.7	1 824.2	2 268.8	2 791.7	2 229.9
Morocco receipts	547.2	588.4	762.5	948.3	1 054.2	1 012.9
Morocco payments	- 48.5	- 52.5	- 62.6	- 68.5	- 65.1	- 47.2
Morocco net	498.7	535.9	699.9	879.8	989.1	965.7
Yemen AR receipts	795.1	1 256.1	1 286.3	1 239.2	1 321.5	975.2
Yemen AR payments	- 118.6	- 243.0	- 345.3	- 284.0	- 231.7	- 185.6
Yemen AR net	676.5	1013.1	941.0	955.2	1 089.8	789.6
PDR Yemen receipts	120.8	191.4	257.7	322.2	352.3	409.5
PDR Yemen payments	- 1.5	- 4.1	- 2.9	- 5.2	- 4.9	- 5.0
PDR Yemen net	119.3	187.3	254.8	317.0	374.4	405.5
Tunisia receipts	142.0	161.1	221.6	282.9	318.9	357.3
Tunisia payments	- 9.2	- 11.7	- 15.0	- 14.2	- 14.3	- 11.8
Tunisia net	132.8	149.4	206.6	268.2	304.6	345.5
Sudan receipts	40.1	40.4	68.9	127.6	262.6	379.8
Sudan payments	- 2.3	- 2.9	- 2.9	- 12.1	- 43.6	- 54.7
Sudan net	37.8	37.5	66.0	115.5	219.0	325.1

Source: Arab Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries, 1976-1986* (Abu Dhabi, Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988).

Table 5

Worker Remittances in the
Arab World: Labor Exporters, 1982-1986

(millions of US dollars)

Country	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Jordan receipts	1 084.0	1 109.9	1 235.6	1 021.8	1 185.3
Jordan payments	- 177.1	- 200.5	- 253.9	- 235.9	- 274.0
Jordan net	906.9	909.4	981.7	785.9	911.3
Algeria receipts	513.4	397.7	333.1	332.0	309.7
Algeria payments	- 127.0	- 156.1	- 141.5	- 131.0	- 100.9
Algeria net	386.4	241.6	191.6	201.0	208.8
Syria receipts	446.0	460.7	na	na	na
Syria payments	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Syria net	446.0	460.7	na	na	na
Somalia receipts	20.0	21.7	169.4	38.2	na
Somalia payments	- 6.2	- 2.6	- 6.5	- 18.8	- 22.6
Somalia net	13.8	19.1	162.9	19.4	na
Egypt receipts	2 480.7	3 688.1	3 981.1	3 216.5	2 515.3
Egypt payments	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Egypt net	2 480.7	3 688.1	3 981.1	3 216.5	2 515.3
Morocco receipts	849.0	916.1	872.3	967.6	1 398.5
Morocco payments	- 37.5	- 34.2	- 26.7	- 17.3	- 15.3
Morocco net	811.5	881.9	845.6	950.4	1 374.2
Yemen AR receipts	1 176.3	1 222.6	1 065.8	943.8	783.6
Yemen AR payments	- 249.9	- 130.6	- 69.8	- 68.6	- 87.9
Yemen AR net	926.4	1 092.0	996.0	875.2	695.7
PDR Yemen receipts	474.5	490.8	505.5	429.1	283.4
PDR Yemen payments	- 4.6	- 4.4	- 6.0	- 3.5	- 1.8
PDR Yemen net	469.0	486.4	499.5	425.6	281.6
Tunisia receipts	372.0	359.2	316.7	271.1	361.3
Tunisia payments	- 12.1	- 8.6	- 10.3	- 11.2	- 3.5
Tunisia net	359.9	350.6	306.4	259.9	357.8
Sudan receipts	130.7	274.8	283.7	258.9	115.0
Sudan payments	- 25.4	- 28.5	- 8.0	- 11.8	- 25.0
Sudan net	105.3	246.3	275.7	247.1	90.0

Source: Arab Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries, 1976-1986* (Abu Dhabi, Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988).

Table 6

Worker Remittances in the
Arab World: Labor Importers, 1976-1981

(millions of US dollars)

Country	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Saudi Arabia rec	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Saudi Arabia pay	-988.3	-1 506.1	-2 844.5	-3 365.7	-4 093.2	-5 348.9
Saudi Arabia net	-988.3	-1 506.1	-2 844.5	-3 365.7	-4 093.2	-5 348.9
Oman receipts	0.0	0.0	28.8	32.3	35.1	41.3
Oman payments	-219.4	-221.8	-241.6	-281.7	-397.0	-497.6
Oman net	-219.4	-221.8	-212.8	-249.4	-361.9	-456.3
Kuwait receipts	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kuwait payments	-315.2	-370.1	-433.2	-532.3	-692.4	-688.7
Kuwait net	-315.2	-370.1	-433.2	-532.3	-692.4	-688.7
Libya receipts	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Libya payments	-243.6	-839.4	-931.5	-832.0	-1 051.6	-1 530.6
Libya net	-243.6	-839.4	-931.5	-832.0	-1 051.6	-1 530.6
Bahrain receipts	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bahrain payments	-252.7	-300.5	-386.4	-278.8	-285.2	-317.6
Bahrain net	-252.7	-300.5	-386.4	-278.8	-285.2	-317.6
Mauritania rec	0.5	0.4	0.5	2.3	5.6	3.7
Mauritania pay	-24.9	-22.3	-21.2	-32.2	-32.1	-21.5
Mauritania net	-24.4	-29.1	-20.7	-29.9	-26.5	-17.8

Source: Arab Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries, 1976-1986* (Abu Dhabi, Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988).

Table 7

Worker Remittances in the
Arab World: Labor Importers, 1982-1986

(millions of US dollars)

Country	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Saudi Arabia rec	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Saudi Arabia pay	- 5 346.7	- 5 236.0	- 5 282.9	- 5 199.4	- 4 804.3
Saudi Arabia net	- 5 346.7	- 5 236.0	- 5 282.9	- 5 199.4	- 4 804.3
Oman receipts	43.1	43.8	43.1	43.7	38.7
Oman payments	- 596.2	- 735.5	- 860.0	- 946.3	- 890.5
Oman net	- 553.1	- 691.7	- 816.9	- 902.6	- 851.8
Kuwait receipts	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kuwait payments	- 875.5	- 864.8	- 962.5	- 1 043.7	- 1 084.0
Kuwait net	- 875.5	- 864.8	- 962.5	- 1 043.7	- 1 084.0
Libya receipts	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Libya payments	- 1 574.3	- 2 032.2	na	na	na
Libya net	- 1 574.3	- 2 032.2	na	na	na
Mauritania rec	2.3	1.2	0.9	0.8	1.9
Mauritania pay	- 31.5	- 27.2	- 24.1	- 24.3	- 29.7
Mauritania net	- 29.2	- 26.0	- 23.2	- 23.5	- 27.8
Bahrain receipts	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bahrain payments	- 322.1	- 298.4	- 331.7	- 402.2	- 706.4
Bahrain net	- 322.1	- 298.4	- 331.7	- 402.2	- 706.4

Source: Arab Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries, 1976-1986* (Abu Dhabi, Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988).

Table 8

Relative share of Worker Remittances
in the Arab World: Labor Exporters, 1976-1980

(ratio of remittances to:)

Country	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Jordan GDP	0.30	0.27	0.22	0.20	0.19
Jordan Imports	0.30	0.25	0.23	0.18	0.20
Jordan Exports	0.70	0.60	0.52	0.44	0.40
Algeria GDP	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Algeria Imports	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02
Algeria Exports	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.02
Syria GDP	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.09	0.06
Syria Imports	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.25	0.17
Syria Exports	0.04	0.07	0.52	0.47	0.32
Somalia GDP	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.04
Somalia Imports	0.01	0.01	0.28	0.09	0.12
Somalia Exports	0.01	0.03	0.71	0.34	0.43
Egypt GDP	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.13	0.11
Egypt Imports	0.18	0.15	0.22	0.29	0.23
Egypt Exports	0.29	0.22	0.37	0.47	0.27
Morocco GDP	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06
Morocco Imports	0.14	0.13	0.18	0.19	0.19
Morocco Exports	0.28	0.27	0.31	0.32	0.29
Yemen AR GDP	0.08	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.13
Yemen AR Imports	0.15	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.18
Yemen AR Exports	1.95	3.53	2.45	1.80	2.12
PDR Yemen GDP	0.38	0.48	0.55	0.59	0.56
PDR Yemen Imports	0.39	0.45	0.58	0.65	0.54
PDR Yemen Exports	1.44	2.12	2.89	3.10	3.87
Tunisia GDP	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04
Tunisia Imports	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.08
Tunisia Exports	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.09
Sudan GDP	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03
Sudan Imports	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.11	0.11
Sudan Exports	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.19	0.18

Source: Arab Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries, 1976-1986*
(Abu Dhabi, Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988).

Table 9

**Relative Share of Worker Remittances
in the Arab World: Labor Exporters, 1981-1985**

(ratio of remittances to:)

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Jordan GDP	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.25	0.20
Jordan Imports	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.25	0.21
Jordan Exports	0.46	0.48	0.52	0.51	2.11
Algeria GDP	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Algeria Imports	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
Algeria Exports	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.04
Syria GDP	0.03	0.03	0.02	na	na
Syria Imports	0.11	0.10	0.09	na	na
Syria Exports	0.22	0.18	0.19	na	na
Somalia GDP	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.12	0.03
Somalia Imports	0.12	0.03	0.05	0.38	0.08
Somalia Exports	0.31	0.01	0.14	1.35	0.22
Egypt GDP	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.07
Egypt Imports	0.19	0.21	0.32	0.30	0.24
Egypt Exports	0.29	0.28	0.42	0.44	1.30
Morocco GDP	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.08
Morocco Imports	0.19	0.16	0.22	0.20	0.23
Morocco Exports	0.31	0.26	0.30	0.28	0.46
Yemen AR GDP	0.14	0.26	0.28	0.28	0.24
Yemen AR Imports	0.19	0.40	0.52	0.60	0.58
Yemen AR Exports	1.64	4.41	4.44	4.64	18.66
PDR Yemen GDP	0.53	0.52	0.48	0.46	0.38
PDR Yemen Imports	0.49	0.54	0.52	0.49	0.39
PDR Yemen Exports	4.14	4.39	4.16	3.81	8.39
Tunisia GDP	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03
Tunisia Imports	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.08
Tunisia Exports	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.19
Sudan GDP	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.04
Sudan Imports	0.15	0.06	0.12	0.15	0.20
Sudan Exports	0.22	0.08	0.22	0.25	0.50

Source: Arab Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries, 1976-1986* (Abu Dhabi, Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988).

Table 10

Comparison of Arab World Labor Importers
and Exporters: Structural, Budgetary Differences

(means)

	Labor Importers	Labor Exporters
Structural Factors (percent of non-oil GDP)		
1975		
Agriculture	6.0	30.3
Manufacturing	13.0	9.5
Construction	19.9	5.9
Services	26.5	18.1
Distribution	32.5	27.4
1980		
Agriculture	4.6	24.4
Manufacturing	11.7	9.7
Construction	18.6	6.9
Services	26.0	19.0
Distribution	35.5	27.2
1985		
Agriculture	5.7	24.7
Manufacturing	12.0	10.1
Construction	14.2	6.7
Services	30.3	17.0
Expenditures		
1975		
Absorption/GDP	0.70	1.26
Imports/Absorption	0.59	0.39
Resource Gap/Absorption	0.68	-0.19
Government Exp/Absorption	0.68	0.81
Military Exp/Absorption	0.13	0.26
1980		
Absorption/GDP	0.67	1.32
Imports/Absorption	0.57	0.43
Resource Gap/Absorption	0.57	-0.22
Government Exp/Absorption	0.59	0.31
Military Exp/Absorption	0.15	0.08
1985		
Absorption/GDP	0.91	1.34
Imports/Absorption	0.41	0.41
Resource Gap/Absorption	0.18	-0.23
Government Exp/Absorption	0.56	0.35
Military Exp/Absorption	0.18	0.09

STRUCTURES DES TRANSFERTS DE FONDS ET DE LA MIGRATION DE TRAVAILLEURS DANS LE MONDE ARABE

Depuis l'augmentation des prix du pétrole en 1973-1974, la migration de travailleurs a été un des principaux facteurs affectant les économies du monde arabe. L'auteur de cet article examine la situation telle qu'elle est aujourd'hui. Quels ont été les principaux courants migratoires? De quelle manière ont-ils affecté le flux des transferts de fonds dans le monde arabe? Quelles sont les caractéristiques structurelles qui ont été associées à cette évolution?

Une constatation importante de cette étude en termes absolus au cours des dernières années: la part des transferts de fonds dans les recettes provenant d'exportations de la plupart des pays exportateurs a augmenté. La Jordanie, l'Égypte, les deux Yémens, la Tunisie et le Soudan ont tous enregistré des augmentations importantes de la part des transferts de fonds dans leurs exportations.

D'autre part, il y a eu une stabilisation, voire un léger déclin, de l'importance des transferts de fonds dans l'ensemble du Produit intérieur brut de plusieurs des principaux pays exportateurs de main-d'oeuvre et, parmi eux, la RPD du Yémen et peut-être aussi la Jordanie et l'Égypte. Par contre, la part des transferts de fonds a augmenté de manière relativement importante dans les économies de la République Arabe du Yémen et peut-être du Soudan.

Il est intéressant de noter que, en termes de structure, si le pays importateurs de main-d'oeuvre ont enregistré un taux d'importation beaucoup plus élevé dans le montant total de leurs dépenses en 1975 et 1980, ils ont enregistré, en fin de période, des taux identiques à ceux des pays exportateurs de main-d'oeuvre.

LAS MODALIDADES DE LA MIGRACION LABORAL Y LAS REMESAS FINANCIERAS EN EL MUNDO ARABE

Desde que se produjo el incremento de los precios del petróleo durante el bienio 1973-1974, la migración laboral ha venido constituyendo un factor principal en las economías del mundo árabe. El objeto del presente artículo es pasar revista a la cuestión desde entonces hasta la fecha. ¿Cuáles han sido las principales modalidades de la migración? ¿Cómo han influido sobre la corriente de remesas financieras en esa región? ¿Qué características estructurales han llegado a vincularse con este proceso?

Una de las principales comprobaciones del estudio fue que si bien las remesas financieras han venido nivelándose en términos absolutos durante estos últimos años, las remesas han ido en incremento como porcentajes de los ingresos provenientes del comercio exterior de la mayoría de los países exportadores: en efecto, tanto Jordania y Egipto como ambos Yemenes, Túnez y Sudán han registrado importantes aumentos en la participación de las remesas dentro del volumen de los ingresos de la exportación.

A la inversa, se ha producido una nivelación y hasta una ligera reducción de la parte correspondiente a las remesas en el producto nacional bruto de varios de los principales países exportadores de recursos humanos. Entre ellos se cuentan la RPD de Yemen y quizás también Jordania y Egipto. En cambio, las remesas han aumentado su importancia relativa en las economías de la RA de Yemen, y quizás también de Sudán.

Es interesante destacar que, en términos estructurales, si bien los países importadores de recursos humanos han registrado un tasa significativa más elevada de las importaciones en relación con el total de sus gastos tanto en 1975 como en 1980, llegaron a finalizar el periodo con proporciones idénticas a las de los países exportadores de recursos humanos.