

# MANPOWER DILEMMAS IN A RETAINER STATE: KUWAIT, 1970-85

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**From the editors:** *Kuwait has become the focus of world attention since Robert Looney wrote this article. The article describes the Kuwait that was. The mention of trends and future needs refers of course to the Kuwait of before August 2, 1990. The article provides insight into that Kuwait, and into the issues that the restored Kuwait will be dealing with.*

## Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to: (1) trace the major labor force trends in Kuwait, particularly those concerning Kuwaiti versus non-Kuwaiti workers; and (2) identify the major manpower problems facing the country and assess the likely prospects for the future. With regard to the latter it appears that a number of inherent problems have contributed to the manner in which Kuwaiti labor markets have evolved over the last twenty-five years: (1) the easy availability of jobs, (2) the prevalence of package contracts, (3) planner biases, and (4) low worker morale.

The net result of these factors is that commitment to the national goals of Kuwait is low, and the elements of frustration and labor alienation are likely to be high. The impact of such an environment on the indigenous labor force is bound to be negative since the social relations within the workplace are based on mutual hostility and mistrust rather than on cooperation. The situation in Kuwait is further aggravated by the presence of various nationalities competing against each other.

## Introduction

There is an abundance of literature on underdeveloped countries which emphasizes capital shortage and surplus of labor as the impediments to economic growth. Much less is known about situations in which a surplus of capital and shortage of labor (manpower) are the problem. Kuwait, with its unusual combination of capital surplus and scarcity of indigenous labor, both skilled and unskilled<sup>1</sup>, is just such a case.

The immigrant labor force in Kuwait is characterized by a wide variety of nationalities, ethnic groups, cultures and educational and professional standards. The absence until recently of labor immigration restrictions has allowed this diversity to develop.<sup>2</sup> The contribution made by these immigrants is outstanding in its variety (68 different nationalities), quantity (over 50 percent of total manpower) and quality (covering every sector of the economy).

The purpose of this paper is to trace the major labor force trends in Kuwait, particularly those concerning Kuwaiti vs non-Kuwaiti workers. Which areas of the economy have attracted the greatest share of both Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti workers and why? How have these patterns shifted over time? What are the major manpower problems facing the country and what are the likely prospects for the future?

## Labor Force

Kuwaitis accounted for roughly 25 percent of the employed workers in 1970 (Table 1). This increased to 28.9 percent in 1975, only to fall to 21.2 and 18.6 percent respectively in 1980 and 1985. This trend has been largely the result of declining labor participation rates among Kuwaiti men. In addition, the participation rate of non-Kuwaiti women has averaged three times that of Kuwaiti women.

The major obstacle to Kuwaiti women's full participation in the labor force is the traditional prohibition against women accepting employment in all but a few sectors. Women entering the labor force are limited to jobs considered socially proper (i.e., education, social work, nursing and medicine). Although there are no official government restrictions against female participation in any job area, the threat of social stigma is sufficient to keep women in these traditional roles.<sup>3</sup>

## Distribution by Economic Sector

One of the major objectives of most small oil exporting states is to diversify away from hydrocarbons so that long run economic growth and development will be self-sustaining and not subject to fluctuations in international oil markets. While the Kuwaiti government emphasizes industrial development as the means to achieve this objective, a fairly large segment of Kuwaiti public opinion opposes further expansion in the industrial sector. Opposition to further industrial expansion is based on two arguments: one economic and the other, more cogent, which centers on the threat of industrialization to the already delicate balance of Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis in the country.<sup>4</sup>

Economically, opponents point out that industrialization as a long-term goal of development is quite uncertain due to the lack of natural resources (other than oil and natural gas), the limited size of the market, the inadequacy of the existing scientific and technological infrastructure, and the time-tested disdain shown by the Kuwaiti labor force toward participation in industrial blue collar activities. Furthermore, if economic diversification is the rationale for industrialization then this process may well be realized more efficiently by expanding the services sector, notably banking.

The opponents of industrialization contend that Kuwait has all the necessary prerequisites for an active international financial center. If such a center were coupled with equally viable trade and insurance sectors, it would be possible to diversify the economy without expanding the industrial base.

Demographically, industrialization would certainly lead to a greater influx of foreign workers, who would further threaten the current population imbalance between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. The oppositionists cite as evidence data which indicate:<sup>5</sup>

1. The percentage of Kuwaitis in the total population has been steadily declining and additional expansion in industrial activities would only reduce the percentage of Kuwaitis even further.
2. A rising percentage of foreign workers, especially those who manage to bring their families to Kuwait, eventually to settle there for good.
3. For each additional unit of labor imported to expand the industrial sector, additional units must also be imported to meet the demand created by the newcomers for such services as education, health, defense, transportation, etc., and

4. As Arab labor-exporting countries begin to tighten emigration laws in order to decrease the adverse effects of the manpower migration to the Gulf countries on their own economies, Gulf states will resort to importing Asian workers who are ethnically and culturally incongruous, thus contributing to the deterioration of the cultural identity of Kuwaiti society.

On the other hand, pro-industrialization arguments rest on the traditional benefits of industrialization. These include: diversifying the economy, capitalizing on the nation's factor endowments (especially capital, energy, and geographical location), strengthening the economy's inter-sectorial linkages, absorbing a larger share of the country's oil surplus revenue in productive assets at home, ensuring job opportunities for future generations (especially the 60 percent of the Kuwaiti population that is currently under age 20), reducing the nation's dependence on foreign suppliers (particularly with respect to strategic products and basic necessities), and substituting income generating fixed assets at home for foreign credit instruments currently held by both the government and the private sector.

Furthermore, proponents argue that industrialization in the long run will contribute to the establishment of an association between hard work and earned income, create a producing rather than a consuming society, widen the national scientific and technological infrastructure, produce non-traditional products, strengthen regional economic ties and ultimately prepare the country for the new economic realities of the post-oil era.

Whatever one's view, the fact remains that stepped up investment in industry following the 1973/74 oil price increases has accomplished little (Tables 2 and 3) in terms of creating jobs for Kuwaitis. In fact, by 1985, there were considerably fewer (4,692) Kuwaiti workers in manufacturing than before the oil price increases (6,109). At the same time, the number of foreign workers in manufacturing has nearly doubled, increasing from 25,982 in 1970 to 46,397 in 1985.

Several other interesting patterns have developed over the years (Tables 2 and 3):

1. The well-publicized expansion of the financial sector has created additional jobs for Kuwaitis. Over the decade 1975-85, Kuwaiti employment in this sector increased at an annual average rate of 13.3 percent per annum (non-Kuwaiti employment in the sector increased at 15.8 percent per annum during the same period).

2. By far the highest proportion of the labor force is employed in the social services. This sector accounted for 43.9 percent of the workforce in 1970. By 1975, this figure had risen to 53.7 percent. While the ratio fell to 44.0 percent in 1980, it had increased to nearly 49 percent by 1985.

These trends have continued into the late 1980s. As of March 1988 (Table 4):

1. Over 77 percent of Kuwaitis worked in the social and personal services sector. The corresponding percentage of non-Kuwaitis was 53.8 percent.

2. No other sector of the economy employed over 10 percent of the Kuwaiti population - the highest being transport and communications which employed 6.7 percent of the Kuwaitis that year.

3. In contrast, the non-Kuwait population was fairly well diversified by sector, with 15.6 percent of the population in construction, 11.6 in wholesale and

retail trade and 7.3 percent in manufacturing.

In terms of labor turnover there is an increasing tendency for foreign laborers to stay in the country, renewing their work permits (Tables 5 and 6):

1. In 1977, 47.0 percent of work permits were renewals. By 1987, this percentage had risen to 66.3 percent.
2. Historically, several sectors have relied more on renewals rather than first time workers. These are manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade and the financial area. This suggests a quasi-permanent foreign workforce is manning these sectors.

In terms of sectoral concentration, the question that arises here is: why is the majority of the labor force concentrated in the government sector? The answer lies in the government welfare system and employment policy. The government welfare system, which guarantees every inhabitant of Kuwait a free education, free health and other services, has led to the expansion of government programs and thereby created new job opportunities which have been filled by the non-Kuwaiti labor force because the native population has been unable to provide the necessary manpower.<sup>6</sup>

Government employment policy is designed to promote a more equitable distribution of income among the Kuwaiti population. Thus a policy of guaranteed employment for every Kuwaiti citizen has been adopted. As stated in Article 41 of the constitution:<sup>7</sup>

Every Kuwaiti has the right to work and to choose the type of his work. Work is the duty of every citizen necessitated by personal dignity and public good. The state shall endeavor to make it available to citizens and to make its terms equitable.

Despite this commitment to employment, government programs do not assure that public sector jobs taken by Kuwaitis are in the national interest. For example, despite the fact that Kuwait has a critical need for teachers, many Kuwaitis refuse to take jobs as teachers because:<sup>8</sup>

1. Less demanding jobs are available in other government ministries.
2. The Ministry of Education is the largest in the state and the chance of promotion is thus very slight.
3. Teaching jobs are considered hard work, requiring preparation and study.
4. The abundant supply of teachers from other Arab states has made it possible for Kuwaitis to look for employment in other fields.

### **Occupational Structure**

The distribution of the labor force by major occupational group (Tables 7 and 8) largely reflects the sectoral patterns above. However, several other patterns are of interest for manpower policy:<sup>9</sup>

1. As of 1985, Kuwaitis are outnumbered in every occupational group.
2. Kuwaitis are becoming relatively less inclined towards sales occupations as well as production and related occupations, which implies a continued heavy dependence on foreigners to fill such jobs.
3. Excessive reliance on government provision of jobs may discourage the

productive employment of Kuwaitis. The continued use of migrant labor combined with the high level of wealth seems to have led to the proliferation of luxury employment for the nationals. This situation will not be remedied if past trends continue.

4. The decline of Kuwaiti males (as a percentage of all males) employed in professional and technical occupations is indicative of inappropriate education and training programs.

5. The increased labor force participation of females is an encouraging trend which may significantly reduce the dependence on foreign workers in the future. For this to happen, however, the occupational roles of females would need to be broadened beyond the two in which they are currently concentrated, namely professional-technical work and clerical work. Although the situation is changing dramatically, careers were not generally considered as a serious option for women until recently.

6. The heavy dependence on non-Kuwaitis in service sectors, particularly maids, is likely to continue in the future since such work does not seem to be socially acceptable to Kuwaiti females.

To sum up, a number of inherent problems have contributed to the manner in which Kuwaiti labor markets have evolved over the last twenty five years:<sup>10</sup>

1. **The Easy Availability of Jobs.** The lack of competition, and the lack of an objective system of rewards and punishments are all likely to result in a low level of job commitment and low productivity among the indigenous labor force. Continued dependence on imported labor may intensify this trend further.

2. **The Prevalence of Package Contracts.** In certain production-related projects where foreign companies are granted package contracts there is little employment or training opportunity for the indigenous labor force. Dependence on such package contracts clearly implies that if local skills are not developed, continued reliance on foreign workers is inevitable.

3. **The Cost Factor.** Even after large projects are completed, the maintenance crews, e.g., electricians, elevator mechanics, plumbers, and cleaners are inevitably foreign. There seems little interest among Kuwaitis for learning these skills, perhaps because such jobs are arduous or are regarded as menial. From an economic point of view, it is cheaper in the short run to import skilled workers, rather than to train Kuwaitis. In the long run, however, Kuwaitis must learn such skills if the national goal is to reduce dependence on foreign workers.

4. **Planner Biases.** In some cases where the planners themselves are non-Kuwaitis, there may be a tendency to design projects which necessitate either a further importation or continued heavy reliance on workers of a given nationality or country.

5. **Low Worker Morale.** Social scientists have observed that factors such as the temporary nature of migration, the low degree of social interaction between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis, and the social disparity between different sections of the society are all likely to lead to lower worker morale. Such conditions are also likely to lead to an absence of social cohesion within the society and a growing hostility among its various sectors.

The net result of these factors is that commitment to the national goals of

Kuwait is low and the elements of frustration and labor alienation are likely to be high. The impact of such an environment on the indigenous labor force is bound to be negative since the social relations within the work situation are based on mutual hostility and mistrust rather than on cooperation. The situation in Kuwait is further aggravated by the presence of various nationalities who compete against each other.

### **Measures to Reduce Dependence on Foreign Labor**

The immigrant labor force is a majority in all sectors of the economy, both private and governmental. In such a situation, Kuwaitis feel compelled to compete with foreigners in all jobs within all sectors. This is so despite a commitment from the government to gradually increase the proportion of Kuwaitis in posts that are presently occupied by immigrant workers.

Several measures to implement "Kuwaitization" of the work force and thus reduce dependence on foreign workers have consisted of:<sup>11</sup>

1. Preference for contractors who bring their own workers with them, without encouraging workers to settle in the country.
2. Stricter control of illegal immigrants.
3. Amendments regarding the valid period of residence and limiting non-national work permits to two years.
4. A massive increase in expenditure on education and vocational training aimed at accelerating the replacement of expatriate workers with nationals.

The government policy of Kuwaitization has come under criticism, with its sharpest detractors arguing that the program has probably created as many problems as it was intended to alleviate:<sup>12</sup>

1. It lowered productivity across the complete spectrum of the labor force; in Kuwaiti nationals who are guaranteed employment regardless of their productivity and in the non-Kuwaitis who know their chances of promotion are slim how ever hard they work.
2. Posts in the higher grades of administration require more educational qualifications and experience than Kuwaitis often possess. Government policy was, therefore, geared towards placing unqualified staff in posts of importance. This situation was aggravated in the civil service by regulations directing promotion on seniority rather than qualification. As a consequence, the promotion of Kuwaitis did not follow a normal ranking and career path. All this led to negative effects on the professional structure and labor performance, and in addition, resulted in much social prejudice.
3. While attempts are being made to train the indigenous labor force to take technical jobs, many of which are currently manned by foreigners, the general societal attitudes towards technical and manual work are not favorable. University and high school students who constitute the future labor force of the country are more inclined towards the arts than scientific and technical disciplines. Such attitudes imply that many of the support services will continue to be run by foreigners.

Given this situation, the question remains of whether it is possible to achieve Kuwaitization of the labor force, diversification of the economy, and reduced dependence on migrant workers simultaneously? In all likelihood the answer is no.

All research studies and plans conducted so far have shown that the Kuwaiti economy will continue to be dependent on the foreign work force and that this workforce will always outnumber the locals. Al-Moosa and McLachlan have shown that the shortage in the Kuwaiti labor force is in both quantity and quality, and the shortage in quality is the more serious. This is due, among other factors, to many of the government's own expenditure and development policies.

An example of this is the present expansion policy in the health services, which resulted in the opening of three large hospitals in a very short period, all equipped with very sophisticated and expensive medical equipment. This sudden expansion was undertaken at a time when the Ministry suffered from a shortage of doctors and skilled technicians. This shortage is reflected in the Ministry's policy which prevents any doctor from practicing his profession outside government hospitals. Such rules apply to both foreign and Kuwaiti doctors. Similar policies also apply in educational and other services.<sup>13</sup>

### Conclusions

"Kuwaitization" is particularly advanced in the civil service and the public sector where nine out of 10 Kuwaitis work. In the private sector, employers are urged to take on nationals, but often prefer a cheaper, more skilled foreigner who is not liable to military service. "Kuwaitization and business profits don't go" says one businessman.<sup>14</sup>

Al-Moosa and McLachlan have observed that the concept of "a job" is itself a relatively new phenomenon in Kuwait, and was only introduced after the discovery of oil and the need to fill government posts to administer this new wealth. Thus, from its inception, this concept changed the social relationships in the Kuwaiti communities themselves, especially so in the absence of distinct job ranking and clear promotion systems. The inflow of immigrants deepened these social problems still further. Low productivity among the Kuwaiti labor force has been explained by some researchers as reflecting an attitude that salaries received are the worker's rightful share of the national wealth and have nothing to do with job performance or productivity. More likely is the explanation that promotion is not related to performance so there is no incentive to work harder or upgrade qualifications.

How ever determined the government policy may be, foreign workers will remain essential to the Kuwaiti economy for many years to come, both as laborers and as skilled administrators and professionals.<sup>15</sup>

### NOTES

1. Shamlan Y. Alessa, *The Manpower Problem in Kuwait* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1981), pp.xiii, xiv.
2. Abdulrasool Al-Moosa and Keith McLachlan, *Immigrant Labor in Kuwait* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p.6.
3. Alessa, *op. cit.*, p.16.
4. *Ibid.*, p.5.
5. *Ibid.*, p.5-6.
6. *Ibid.*, p.19.
7. Constitution of the State of Kuwait, November 11, 1972.
8. Alessa, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
9. See also the discussion in Nasra Shah, "Foreign Workers in Kuwait: Implications for the

Kuwait Labor Force," *International Migration Review* (Winter 1986), p.826.

10. *Ibid.*, p.829.

11. *Ibid.*, p.831.

12. Al-Moosa and McLachlan, *op. cit.*, pp.35-36.

13. *Ibid.*, p.48.

14. Vicot Mallet, "Foreigners Take the Pinch." *Financial Times* (February 23, 1989), p.14.

15. *Ibid.*

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**Table 1**

**Kuwait: Labor Force**

	Kuwaiti		Non-Kuwaiti		Total	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
<b>1970</b>						
Employed	57,531	2,017	160,048	14,447	217,579	16,464
Unemployed	5,783	38	2,338	94	8,121	132
Total in Labor Force	*63,314	2,055	162,286	14,541	255,600	16,596
Populat.*	100,737	98,914	177,603	83,396	278,340	182,310
% in Labor Force	62.9	2.1	91.4	17.4	81.1	9.1
<b>1975</b>						
Employed	78,301	7,295	183,524	27,475	261,825	34,770
Unemployed	6,066	182	1,485	254	7,551	436
Total in Labor Force**	84,367	7,477	185,009	27,729	269,376	35,206
Populat.**	118,529	120,117	201,125	114,159	319,654	234,276
% in Labor Force	71.2	6.2	92.0	24.3	84.3	15.0
<b>1980</b>						
Employed	88,659	13,811	331,942	48,229	420,601	62,040
Unemployed	4,929	361	2,702	876	7,631	1,237
Total in Labor Force	**93,588	14,172	334,644	49,105	428,232	63,277
Populat.**	140,914	147,311	359,252	165,652	499,266	312,963
% in Labor Force	66.8	9.6	93.2	29.6	85.8	20.2
<b>1985</b>						
Employed	98,594	24,422	432,402	105,077	530,996	129,499
Unemployed	3,013	381	4,248	2,248	7,261	2,629
Total in Labor Force**	101,607	24,803	436,650	107,325	538,257	132,128
Populat.**	170,761	179,582	476,324	245,549	647,085	425,131
% in Labor Force	59.5	13.8	91.7	43.7	83.2	31.1

Source: State of Kuwait *Annual Statistical Abstract, 1988* (Ministry of Planning: Central Statistical Office, 1989), p. 127.

Notes: \* Age 12 years and over.

\*\* Age 15 years and over.

Table 2

## Kuwait: Labor Force by Economic Activity, 1970-1975

Occupation		1970		1975		Non-Kuwaiti	
		Kuwaiti	%	Kuwaiti	%		
Agri-	M	798	19.7	3,253	3,970	53.0	3,522
culture,	F	4	44.4	5	13	59.1	9
fishing	T	802	19.8	3,258	3,983	53.0	3,531
Mining	M	1,627	25.2	4,828	1,767	37.3	2,953
and	F	48	6.7	668	12	8.6	127
Quarrying	T	1,675	23.4	5,497	1,779	36.6	3,080
Manufac-	M	6,100	19.1	25,876	2,237	9.3	21,889
turing	F	9	7.8	106	21	6.2	320
Industries	T	6,109	19.0	25,982	2,258	9.2	22,209
Const-	M	2,186	6.5	31,418	1,755	5.5	130,357
truction	F	2	2.9	66	1	0.7	143
	T	2,188	6.5	31,484	1,756	5.4	130,500
Elect-	M	2,130	29.4	5,106	2,029	27.9	5,230
ricity/	F	39	18.8	13	5	41.7	7
gas/water	T	2,133	29.4	5,119	2,034	28.0	5,237
Wholesale	M	6,250	21.6	22,704	6,297	16.3	32,364
Retail	F	25	7.6	304	30	3.3	868
Trade	T	6,275	21.4	23,008	6,327	16.0	33,232
Trans-	M	2,357	19.6	9,640	4,305	28.4	10,853
portation	F	5	3.5	136	262	49.7	265
Commun	T	2,362	19.5	9,776	4,567	29.1	11,118
Finance	M	1,092	23.7	3,507	1,295	22.2	4,548
Real	F	13	4.3	289	82	12.1	598
Estate	T	1,105	22.5	3,796	1,377	21.1	5,146
Social	M	34,838	39.5	53,371	56,011	43.7	72,203
Services	F	1,906	12.9	12,850	6,877	21.4	25,188
	T	36,744	34.7	66,221	62,888	38.9	97,391
Total	M	57,614	26.4	160,262	79,666	30.2	183,919
Labor	F	2,020	12.3	14,458	7,305	21.0	27,525
Force	T	59,634	25.4	174,720	86,971	29.1	211,444

Source: State of Kuwait, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1988 (Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, 1988), p.117.

**Table 3**  
**Kuwait: Labor Force by Economic Activity, 1980-1985**

Occupation		1980		1985			
		Kuwaiti	% Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	% Non-Kuwaiti		
Agri-	M	3,886	42.3	5,184	21.7	9,799	
culture,	F	52	65.0	28	66	55.9	52
fishing	T	3,938	43.0	5,212	2,781	22.0	9,851
Mining	M	2,364	36.7	4,075	2,468	36.8	4,233
and	F	33	15.0	187	43	13.0	289
Quarrying	T	2,397	36.0	4,262	2,511	35.7	4,522
Manufac-	M	3,107	7.7	37,432	4,552	9.1	45,262
turing	F	72	10.0	649	140	4.2	1,135
Industries	T	3,179	7.7	38,081	4,692	9.2	46,397
Const-	M	1,194	1.2	95,331	1,435	1.2	121,543
ruction	F	12	2.1	562	27	2.3	1,160
	T	1,206	1.2	95,893	1,462	1.2	122,694
Elect-	M	2,039	25.1	6,076	1,510	20.4	5,877
ricity/	F	29	55.8	23	54	78.3	15
gas/ water	T	2,068	25.3	6,099	1,564	20.9	5,902
Wholesale	M	4,513	8.0	52,027	5,932	8.2	66,524
Retail	F	64	3.5	1,813	144	4.1	3,331
Trade	T	4,577	7.8	53,840	6,076	8.0	69,855
Trans-	M	7,180	25.0	21,491	6,812	19.4	28,224
portation	F	652	44.0	830	849	39.1	1,320
Commun	T	7,832	25.9	22,321	7,661	20.6	29,544
Finance	M	2,466	22.7	8,413	3,175	18.6	13,868
Real	F	350	19.4	1,457	693	21.1	2,611
Estate	T	2,816	22.2	9,870	38,680	19.0	16,479
Social	M	62,896	38.1	102,271	70,504	33.8	138,371
Services	F	12,565	22.7	42,721	22,441	19.0	95,413
	T	75,461	34.2	144,992	92,945	28.4	233,784
Total	M	93,588	21.9	334,644	101,607	18.9	436,650
Labor	F	14,172	22.4	49,105	24,803	18.8	107,325
Force	T	107,760	21.9	383,749	126,410	18.9	543,975

Source: State of Kuwait, *Annual Statistical Abstract, 1988* (Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, 1988), p.117.

**Table 4**  
**Kuwait: Distribution of Labor Force**  
**by Economic Activity and Nationality, March 1988**

Economic Activities	Kuwaiti	%	Non-Kuwaiti	%	Total	%
Agriculture/ Fishing	946	0.6	7,810	1.4	8,756	1.3
Mining/ Quarrying	3,212	2.2	2,816	0.5	6,028	0.9
Manufacturing	5,302	3.6	44,858	8.3	50,160	7.3
Electricity Gas, Water	1,738	1.2	5,170	1.0	6,908	1.0
Construction	1,716	1.2	105,688	19.5	107,404	15.6
Wholesale/ Retail Trade	5,016	3.4	74,866	13.9	79,882	11.6
Transport/ Communications	9,834	6.7	27,104	5.0	36,938	5.3
Finance/ Real Estate	5,390	3.6	16,742	3.1	22,132	3.2
Social/ Personal Services	114,598	77.5	255,640	47.3	370,238	53.8
Total	147,752	100.0	540,694	100.0	688,446	100.0

Source: State of Kuwait, *Annual Statistical Abstract, 1988* (Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, 1989).

**Table 5**  
**Kuwait: Residence Permits Issued, 1977-81**

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Agriculture/ fishing					
First Time	875	727	894	1,175	1,186
Renewal	481	583	803	639	731
Mining/ Quarrying					
First Time	251	255	186	129	261
Renewal	828	484	634	798	811
Manufacturing					
First Time	5,908	4,443	4,143	5,146	4,577
Renewal	9,497	9,874	8,879	8,485	8,932
Construction					
First Time	36,976	31,090	25,924	29,398	27,154
Renewal	18,840	25,992	25,266	22,750	26,568
Wholesale/ Retail Trade					
First Time	12,542	7,938	8,309	11,801	9,643
Renewal	17,686	18,790	17,591	15,245	16,156
Transport Communications					
First Time	3,105	1,778	2,075	3,433	3,336
Renewal	2,910	3,504	2,772	2,557	3,448
Finance/					

Real Estate					
First Time	1,883	999	1,456	1,629	1,125
Renewal	2,697	3,052	2,761	2,168	2,719
General/ Social Services					
First Time	1,592	1,050	1,487	3,467	3,172
Renewal	3,418	3,118	2,479	2,263	2,967
Total					
First Time	63,492	48,270	44,474	56,178	50,454
Renewal	56,357	65,397	61,185	54,905	62,332

**Table 6**  
**Kuwait: Residence Permits Issued, 1982-86**

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Agriculture/ fishing					
First Time	2,345	2,983	1,436	1,716	3,904
Renewal	1,206	1,612	2,690	3,441	2,776
Mining/ Quarrying					
First Time	217	307	62	39	0
Renewal	854	874	1,224	723	0
Manufacturing					
First Time	5,746	6,782	1,706	1,805	9,340
Renewal	12,057	14,380	17,178	21,531	10,764
Construction					
First Time	33,944	53,045	26,030	29,291	18,578
Renewal	33,102	45,518	52,584	63,797	18,769
Wholesale/ Retail Trade					
First Time	13,894	11,234	3,956	4,213	40,434
Renewal	24,623	23,566	36,658	40,692	43,411
Transport Communications					
First Time	4,378	5,055	2,265	1,016	4,251
Renewal	5,673	8,531	9,640	12,794	5,953
Finance/ Real Estate					
First Time	1,778	1,202	457	708	2,733
Renewal	4,228	5,229	9,539	8,229	6,806
General/ Social Services					
First Time	6,497	5,467	3,510	2,835	9,026
Renewal	4,171	5,557	11,369	12,267	10,084
Total					
First Time	63,492	48,270	44,474	56,178	50,454
Renewal	85,914	105,267	140,706	163,474	99,051

Table 7  
Kuwait: Labor Force by Occupation, 1970-1975

Occupation		1970			1975		
		Kuwaiti	%	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	%	Non-Kuwaiti
Professional and Technical	M	2,753	15.2	15,373	5,677	20.5	22,002
	F	981	13.1	6,515	4,062	28.7	10,095
Administrative and Managerial	T	3,734	14.6	21,888	9,739	23.3	32,097
	M	608	34.4	1,162	1,024	36.4	1,787
Clerical and Related	F	3	30.0	7	21	48.8	22
	T	611	34.4	1,169	1,045	36.6	1,809
Sales	M	11,028	41.3	15,670	15,804	46.8	17,906
	F	446	29.6	1,060	2,049	48.2	2,205
Service	T	11,474	40.7	16,360	17,853	47.0	20,165
	M	6,529	31.2	14,430	6,162	25.9	17,618
Agricultural/Fishing	F	19	14.2	115	23	7.3	290
	T	6,548	31.0	14,545	6,185	25.7	17,908
Production & Laborers	M	22,709	44.4	28,406	31,798	50.9	30,719
	F	507	7.7	6,114	1,102	7.0	14,681
Total Labor Force	T	23,216	40.2	34,521	32,900	42.0	45,400
	M	8,870	22.6	3,045	3,884	50.5	3,805
Total Labor Force	F	6	54.5	5	13	100.0	-
	T	893	22.6	3,050	3,897	50.6	3,805
Total Labor Force	M	13,331	13.8	82,928	15,315	14.5	90,028
	F	54	27.6	653	33	12.5	232
Total Labor Force	T	13,385	13.9	83,581	15,348	14.5	90,260
	M	59,680	27.0	161,584	79,666	30.2	183,919
Total Labor Force	F	2,022	12.2	14,489	7,305	21.0	27,525
	T	61,682	25.9	176,073	86,971	29.1	211,444

Source: State of Kuwait, *Annual Statistical Abstract, 1988* (Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, 1988), p.117.

Table 8

## Kuwait Labor Force by Occupation, 1980-1985

Occupation	1980	1985		1985		1985	
		Kuwaiti	%	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	% Non-Kuwaiti	
Professional and Technical	M	8,909	16.6	44,698	13,213	18.2	59,409
	F	7,189	29.2	17,465	12,750	35.1	23,554
Administrative and Managerial	T	16,098	20.6	62,163	25,963	23.8	82,963
	M	2,043	33.6	4,043	3,788	37.0	6,455
Clerical and Related	F	69	53.9	59	223	56.9	169
	T	2,112	34.0	4,102	4,011	37.7	6,624
Sales	M	19,782	39.9	29,762	24,564	38.9	38,522
	F	4,855	45.7	5,779	9,497	48.3	10,154
Service	T	24,637	40.9	35,541	34,061	41.2	48,676
	M	5,145	16.9	25,346	5,817	15.9	30,760
Agricultural/Fishing	F	51	9.3	497	93	9.2	919
	T	5,196	16.7	25,843	5,910	15.7	31,697
Production & Laborers	M	36,035	40.8	52,363	38,885	33.2	78,297
	F	1,539	6.0	24,196	1,730	2.4	70,149
First Time Workers	T	37,574	32.9	76,559	40,615	21.5	148,446
	M	3,830	39.2	5,947	2,611	20.1	10,375
Total Labor Force	F	40	7.6	9	46	85.2	8
	T	3,870	24.5	5,956	2,657	20.4	10,383
	M	13,901	7.6	170,141	10,225	4.6	209,884
	F	86	4.5	265	118	24.0	373
	T	13,987	7.6	170,406	10,343	4.7	210,257
	M	3,943	62.7	2,344	2,504	45.9	2,948
	F	343	29.1	835	346	14.8	1,999
	T	4,286	57.4	3,179	2,850	36.6	7,797
	M	93,588	21.8	334,644	101,607	18.9	436,650
	F	14,172	22.4	49,105	24,803	18.8	107,325
	T	107,760	21.9	383,749	126,410	18.9	543,975

Source: State of Kuwait, *Annual Statistical Abstract, 1988* (Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, 1988), p.117.